Bmw M4 Motogp Safety Car Gets Detailed

Set to make its motorsport debut on March 23rd, the safety car has been equipped with an assortment of BMW M Performance Parts. Highlights include a front splitter, a black grille and a titanium exhaust system which is surrounded by carbon fiber exhaust finishers. Other M Performance Parts include carbon mirror caps, aerodynamic side skirts, a rear diffuser and a rear spoiler. The car also has a new hood and an LED light bar. Interior pictures were not released but BMW says the car has an Alcantara-wrapped steering wheel, a carbon gear knob and stainless steel pedals. There’s also Recaro racing seats, Schroth belts and BMW M Performance floor mats. Last but not least, the safety car has a roll bar and a fire extinguisher. Power is provided by a 3.0-liter TwinPower Turbo six-cylinder engine that develops 431 HP (317 kW) and 550 Nm (406 lb-ft) of torque.
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The agency now finds itself under intense scrutiny for failing to spot a defect blamed for at least 12 deaths since 2005. Consumer safety groups say NHTSA should have pressured GM to order a recall as early as 2007. The agency’s acting chief, David Friedman, has been called to testify before a House of Representatives panel in April looking into whether NHTSA failed to heed warning signs. A Senate panel is also planning hearings. FEDS SAY REPORTS “INCONCLUSIVE” Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx, whose sprawling department oversees NHTSA, has defended the agency, saying data about the ignition switch from was “inconclusive”. “It just didn’t point to an investigation” by NHTSA, he said, describing the broad probe that companies fear. That evidence included two reports completed in 2006 and 2007 by outside investigators hired by NHTSA. The reports zeroed in, as Young had, on the ignition problem. Both were the results of so-called Special Crash Investigations, which the agency initiates when it wants to take a deeper dive into accidents and their underlying causes, to help see if a wider NHTSA investigation is warranted. After the 2006 Wisconsin crash, the Chevy Cobalt driven by Megan Ungar-Kerns, now Megan Phillips, was taken to an impound lot.
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Fixing a Weak Safety Culture at General Motors

The switches could, if bumped or weighed down by a heavy key ring, cut off engine power and disable air bags. The question I ask here is not how and why did this dangerous defect occur, but rather what kind of company culture allows passenger safety to be so badly compromised? Lets start with the facts as we can glean them. Fact 1: Broken communication channels.Reports on exactly when (and how) GMs top executives learned about the switches vary. According to one report : The company has acknowledged it learned about the problem switches at least 11 years ago, yet it failed to recall the cars until last month. According to another , GM has said the issue was discovered as early as 2001, and in 2004, a company engineer ran into the problem during the testing phase of the soon-to-be-released Chevrolet Cobalt. Fox Business reported , Barra found out about a review of the Cobalt in December, when she was still head of GMs global product development. In an article on the recall inThe New York Times, Barra claimed she didnt know the serious nature of the defects until Jan. 31, two weeks after she became CEO, when she was informed that two safety committees had concluded that a recall was necessary. This unawareness at the top would be impossible in an organization with a strong safety culture. In fact, the single-most-important attribute of such a culture is proactive and timely voice related to failures, a topic I have studied and written about extensively. This willingness to speak up is especially true for the small and seemingly inconsequential discrepancies that can, when unreported, give rise to catastrophic failures later. Any organization can detect big, expensive failures! Its the great companies that detect the small ones that otherwise go unnoticed. And, when news related to potential failures is withheld as long as humanly possible, safety is the first victim.
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U.S. regulators failed to spot deadly GM defects that others saw

Retired Wisconsin State Trooper Keith Young stands on highway 40 in Elk Mound, Wisconsin March 22, 2014. REUTERS/Andy Clayton-King

The “Integrated Safety Management Concept” pursues a higher level of safety by linking each individual safety technology system equipped on vehicles. Toyota says that it hopes to achieve a vehicle that causes no accidents by implementing safety technologies and developing automobiles that communicate with road infrastructure and surrounding vehicles. In the “Integrated Safety Management Concept”, driving circumstances are classified by the intensity of possible dangers. In other words, Toyota vehicles will assist drivers in each stage of driving (Parking, Active Safety, Pre-Crash Safety, Passive Safety and Rescue) and integrating each system. Aiming for a Society with No Traffic Accidents Pursuit for Vehicle Safety To achieve its ultimate goal of “Real World Safety, or zero casualties from traffic accidents, Toyota follows the three pillars: “Humans / Cars / Traffic Environment”. The manufacturer is developing technologies based on its Integrated Safety Management Concept, announced in 2006. ‘Real-world Safety’ is based on its continuous efforts by learning from real collisions. Their engineers first identify issues by analyzing causal factors for injuries and collisions. Next, they replicate the collision scene with actual vehicles or driving simulator. After developing and evaluating countermeasures, which satisfy performance objectives, they then develop effective safety technologies learning from actual accidents to continue to meet the motor industry’s ever higher safety standards. Integrated Safety Management Concept The “Integrated Safety Management Concept” doesn’t regard each of the safety systems on the car individually, but integrates them to increase safety. Toyota is working towards providing drivers with what it calls ‘optimum driving support,’ not solely at the points which were conventionally focused on before and after an accident, but by encompassing “all driving stages, from parking, to normal operation and the moments before and after a collision, and even avoidance at the moment of an accident.
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